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In an article published in 2010 in Criminology and Public Policy, Henk van de Bunt (2010) magisterially 
showed how “walls of secrecy and silence” had long prevented the disclosure of two major corporate 
scandals: Bernie Madoff’s $50 billion Ponzi scheme, which blew up in 2008, and a cartel involving all 
the major Dutch construction companies and operating from the mid-1990s until 2002. Henk showed 
that these two major cases of corporate crime could long go on unchecked not only because of 
failing supervision but also because of “the successful concealment of illegal activities by the 
perpetrators and the presence of silence in the social environment” (van de Bunt, 2010: 438). 
Drawing on Simmel’s (1950) famous article on secret societies, Henk specifically argued that 
extensive, illegal activities in contemporary legitimate markets can remain secret due to one or more 
of the following factors: the “above suspicion” (ibid.: 441) status of their perpetrators, the “absence 
of interest in disclosing the truth” (ibid.: 443), perpetrators’, bystanders’ and supervisors’ “inaction in 
the face of knowing” (ibid.: 444), their “concerted ignorance” (ibid.: 445) as well as their “fear of the 
consequences of disclosure” (ibid.: 443). 
These mechanisms have most likely also been at work in subsequent corporate scandals—for 
example, those that are currently shaking Volkswagen and much of the European car industry (e.g., 
Fromm et al., 2017; Nussbaum and Sebag, 2017).  In the rest of this contribution, I will show how 
they have long been effective in hiding, promoting and legitimizing the use and supply of doping 
products in elite sports.  
I define doping products as a combination of doping substances and doping methods that have been 
prohibited under sporting rules since the 1960s (for example, Waddington and Smith, 2009) and are 
now included in the World Anti-Doping Code of the World Anti-Doping Agency,1 which entered into 
force in 2004 (see WADA, 2015).2 Athletes use doping substances – ranging from anabolic steroids to 
stimulants and from erythropoietin (EPO) to growth hormones – to enhance their performance or 
evade detection. Some of these substances are also used by non-competitive sportspeople for 
broader lifestyle or psychoactive purposes, such as growing muscle, reducing fat, or boosting 
aggressiveness, and are also known as performance and image-enhancing drugs (for example, 
Graham et al., 2009). Doping products also include performance-enhancing methods, such as blood 
transfusions. In addition to being prohibited by the WADA Code, the trade and distribution of doping 
products are nowadays subject to state restrictions and prohibitions in most European countries, the 
United States, and elsewhere (Houlihan and Garcia, 2012). Some of these countries go even as far to 
prohibit the use of such products at least in elite sports (e.g., Paoli and Donati, 2014). 
                                                          
1 For a formal definition of doping, see WADA, 2015. 
2 As governments cannot be legally bound by a non-governmental document such as the World Anti-
Doping Code, they have implemented it by individually ratifying the UNESCO International Convention against 
Doping in Sport, the first global international treaty against doping in sport, which was adopted in 2005 and 
came into force in early 2007. 
2 
 
To develop my argument, I will use evidence from three recent research projects of mine in Italy, 
Belgium, France and Germany in addition to briefly referring to past and recent scandals and 
investigations concerning other countries (e.g., McLaren, 2016a and b). 
The chapter is structured as follows. In the first section, I present my data sources. In the second and 
third, along the lines of Henk’s analysis, I discuss that the “above suspicion” status of the 
“perpetrators” of doping products as well as the perpetrators’, bystanders’ and supervisors’ 
“concerted ignorance,” “inaction in the face of knowing” and “fear of the consequences of 
disclosure” (Van de Bunt, 2010: 441-445). In the fourth section, I consider a further element that has 
enhanced the “walls of secrecy and silence” (ibid.) long surrounding doping practices: the ambiguous 
legal status of such practices and the products involved. Some concluding remarks follow. 
 
1. Data sources 
To develop my argument, I have primarily relied on the findings of three recent projects. 
The first project is a an empirical study of supply and demand of doping products in Italy that I 
conducted a few years ago with Alessandro Donati on behalf of the World Anti-Doping Agency (Paoli 
and Donati, 2014). Much of the data of that study was collected in close collaboration with the 
Carabinieri Command for Health Protection. This unit is still known – and will be referred to here – by 
the acronym NAS from its original name, Nuclei Anti-Sofisticazione. In that project, our first source 
was the “NAS Investigations Database,” which includes summary data for the 80 major anti-doping 
investigations conducted by NAS between 1999 and 2009. These investigations represent the vast 
majority of the anti-doping criminal investigations and the related criminal proceedings initiated in 
Italy in those years. The second source is a set of official documents related to 46 different criminal 
investigations, 36 of which were carried out by NAS and were thus included in the NAS Investigation 
Database and 10 of which were conducted by other police forces and were thus new. The third 
source is a set of interviews with 26 NAS officers, seven prosecutors, one policymaker, and one other 
expert on anti-doping testing. Donati and I also worked with various other published and 
unpublished materials. In particular, we conducted an extensive review of the three main Italian 
news agencies’ – Ansa, Agi, and Adnkronos – doping-related media reports for the period January 
1998 through February 2012.  
I have conducted the second project, entitled “Doping and its Supply: Exploring the Market and 
Assessing the Impact of Anti-doping Policies in Belgian and French Cycling” together with Bertrand 
Fincoeur (e.g., Fincoeur, 2016;  Fincouer and Paoli, 2014). As the title indicates, the project tackles the 
supply of doping products in Belgium and France’s national sport, i.e., cycling. Specifically, it was 
intended: a) to empirically investigate the supply of doping products; b) to reconstruct the 
implementation of anti-doping policies and specifically supply-side interventions and to assess their 
impact. The data collection included the analysis of policy documents, criminal proceedings and 
teams’ websites and other documents, 77 interviews with different policy-makers, law enforcement 
officers and stakeholders and survey of 2,776 competitive Flemish riders, who returned 767 valid 
questionnaires.  
The third project is not a classical research project but consists of my chairmainship of, and my 
investigative work for, the Evaluierungskommission Freiburger Sportmedizin (hereinafter 
Commission). The Commission was established in 2007 by the University of Freiburg after the Belgian 
soigneur Jef D’Hont revealed that the Team Telekom/T-Mobile cycling team (of which two Tour de 
France winners, Bjarne Riis and Jan Ullrich, were members) systematically used EPO and other 
doping products and that Freiburg University sport physicians had since 1992 been involved in, and 
partially even coordinated, these doping practices. The Commission was composed of eight German 
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and foreign renowned scientists; I became its chair in 2010. The Commission’s main task was to 
evaluate the activities of the Freiburg University Sport Medicine, including its alleged involvement in 
doping practices since the 1950s. Over the years, it heard more than 100 witnesses, including 
(former) athletes, sport physicians, sport and university officials, law enforcement officers and policy-
makers. It also collected and analyzed over 30,000 pages of documentation from more than twelve 
different local and national archives. Five of the Commission’s reports have already been published 
by the University of Freiburg. The reports total more than 1,500 pages (see Albert-Ludwigs-
Universität Freiburg, 2017).  
 
2. The “above suspicion” status of the perpetrators 
As in the cases studied by Henk, the perpetrators of doping practices, too, are mostly “above 
suspicion.” In both Italy and Germany doping products have long been provided to elite athletes by 
physicians, in many cases, university physicians.  
The father of Italian “doping physicians” is undoubtedly Prof. Francesco Conconi, a professor of 
biochemistry at the University of Ferrara since 1967, long-time head of its Centro di Studi Biomedici 
applicati allo Sport and rector of the same university from 1998 to 2004.3 In the late 1970s, Conconi 
started providing a variety of doping products to Italian elite athletes, primarily in track and field, 
cycling, swimming, pentathlon, rowing and ski sports, with the tacit support of CONI, the Italian 
Olympic Committee (see below). By the early 1990s, Conconi also started to provide systematically 
his services to elite riders working in private teams, treating a large number of “stars,” such as Marco 
Pantani, Claudio Chiappucci and Gianni Bugno, at the same time as he was a member of the Medical 
Committee  of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the President of the Medical Commission 
of the Unione Cycliste Internationale (UCI) and received large amounts of funding from the IOC— 
supposedly to develop an EPO test, which he never delivered. At the end of that decade, the Ferrara 
Prosecutor’s Office indicted Conconi and two of his assistants of the crime of sporting fraud.  Despite 
“the seriousness and convergence of all the evidence” (Tribunale di Ferrara, 2003: 46), however, the 
inefficiency of the Italy judicial system and the defendants’ procedural tactics (e.g., Toti, 2003) left 
the Ferrara judge no other choice but to dismiss the case in 2003 due to the statute of limitations.  
In Germany, Conconi’s pendant was represented by Profs. Armin Klümper and Joseph Keul, two 
former top sports doctors of the University of Freiburg Sport Medicine Department, which in the 
1970s and 1980s treated up to 80-90% of the West German elite athletes. Thanks to the 
Commission’s work, it has become clear that the Freiburg sport physicians were long in charge of 
making—with all means, including the use of harmful doping products—West German athletes 
“competitive” vis-à-vis those from East Germany and other nations of the former Soviet bloc which 
had organized a centralized system of “state doping” (Singler and Treutlein, 2015; Strepenick, 2015; 
Berendonk, 1992; Spitzer, 2013).  
Documents revealed by the Commission show that Armin Klümper, the once world-famous ‘Doc’, for 
four decades ago systematically provided the German Cycling Federation, i.e. an entire sports 
federation, with anabolic steroids – possibly including youth and junior teams. These documents also 
show that the Freiburg doctors have doped not only cyclists, but also track and field athletes, soccer 
players, wrestlers, canoeists – and many other athletes in Olympic sports disciplines (e.g., Strepenick, 
2015). Despite being for more than a decade the senior Olympic doctor of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Keul tolerated, and probably even encouraged, the treatment of athletes, including female 
athletes with anabolic steroids despite the proven serious harms of such substances (Singler and 
                                                          
3 See his personal webpage at http://docente.unife.it/francesco.conconi/curr. 
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Treutlein, 2015). Freiburg physicians’ doping practices did not end with Germany’s Reunification in 
1990. The Commission’s investigations and the 2007 Team Telekom/T-Mobile scandal that led to the 
Commission’s institution, indicate that doping continued almost uninterrupted in Freiburg until 2007 
(Singler, 2015-16).  
More generally, the analyses in Italy, France and Belgium indicate that the suppliers of doping 
products rarely appear to have criminal records (Paoli and Donati, 2014; Fincoeur and Paoli, 2014; 
Fincoeur, 2016). Even in Italy the evidence does not suggest a major role for organized crime, as most 
typically construed, in the supply of doping products. The analysis of the Italian criminal proceedings 
and the expert interviews indicate a very limited involvement of Southern Italian mafia groups in the 
production and distribution of doping products in Italy. Only one specific type of suppliers is linked to 
Southern Italian mafia-type organized crime groups: the hijackers who steal doping substances from 
trucks and are often associated with Neapolitan camorra groups. Members of some camorra groups 
also play an important role in fixing horse races, which can be achieved by doping horses (see also 
Paoli and Greenfield, 2017).  
Unlike illegal drug traffickers or dealers, the majority of the suppliers of doping products can hide 
their illegal transactions and their relationships with their “doping partners”—their own suppliers, 
collaborators, and customers or patients—behind the legitimate roles they play in their businesses, 
organizations, or professions. The embeddedness of doping-related supply-side activities in 
legitimate professions, roles, and institutions mostly makes the development of separate illegal 
enterprises to run these activities unnecessary. This embeddedness is suggestive of white-collar 
crime (Sutherland, 1983), and the related and partially overlapping concepts of occupational, 
corporate (Clinard and Quinney, 1973), and organizational crime (Schrager and Short, 1978)—rather 
than organized crime.  
Reflecting this white-collar background, the suppliers of doping products are also rarely reported to 
use physical violence. The evidence on corruption is mixed, depending partly on how one defines 
corruption. In none of the countries studies have we found evidence of bribery. We have found, 
instead, ample evidence of “abuse of public or private office” albeit not necessarily “for personal 
gain” (OECD, 2008: 22). Particularly in elite sports, different types of suppliers—e.g., physicians, 
pharmacists, coaches, and sports federation officials—appear to abuse their positions and the 
athletes’ and the latter’s parents’ trust by prescribing, selling or administering the athletes doping 
products and convincing them of the necessity and harmlessness of doping products (see also next 
section). However, these abuses typically do not occur “for personal gain”—or at least not fully so—
but in the name of a misconceived public or team good.  
 
3. Perpetrators’, bystanders’ and supervisors’ “concerted ignorance,” “inaction” and 
“fear of the consequences of disclosure”  
My three research projects as well as several past and ongoing scandals (see below) document the 
“protection” long provided by officials and staff members of sport authorities and key sport federations, 
some of whom were civil servants and even government officials, to doping elite athletes and the latter’s 
suppliers.   
This protection is most evident in Italy. There, as Italian criminal investigations and the resulting 
scandal indicate, the representatives of national sports bodies, including some very high-ranking 
officials, exercised their roles as “protectors” quite openly until the late 1990s. A fine line might 
separate individuals from their institutions, but a request filed in October 2000 by the Prosecutor’s 
Office of Ferrara in the proceedings against Conconi provides evidence of high-ranking individual 
involvement so much so that it might be difficult to argue against institutional complicity. After 
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reconstructing the relationships between CONI and Conconi since late 1970s, in fact, Prosecutor 
Soprani came to the conclusion that Conconi had set up a “criminal organization” (article 416 of the 
Italian criminal Code, CP; Procura della Repubblica di Ferrara, 2000: 42)  together with three CONI 
Presidents—Franco Carraro (CONI President from 1981 to 1986), Arrigo Gattai (CONI President from 
1987 to 1994), Mario Pescante (CONI Secretary General from 1981 to 1994 and CONI President from 
1995 to 1998)—and the head of the Research and Documentation Section of the CONI School of 
Sport, Gianfranco Carabelli. This criminal association had allegedly the purpose of distributing drugs 
in a dangerous way to public health (article 445 CP) and was active throughout the 1980s (ibid.; see 
also Capodacqua, 2000). Pescante and Conconi were regarded as the promoters of the criminal 
organization. As too much time had elapsed between the alleged activities and the prosecution, 
Soprani had to dismiss the case but insisted that his request “does not diminish the social and 
criminal non-value of the activities proved” (Procura della Repubblica di Ferrara, 2000:  56).  
In Germany the judicial evidence of government and sports federations’ direct involvement in doping 
practices is less overwhelming. There too, though, it is clear that federal, regional and local politicians 
long gave their unofficial, but decisive support to the doping practices of Klümper and Co and that a 
variety of other public entities, including the Freiburg University leadership and the local prosecutor’s 
office and courts, only showed benign neglect for such practices and did not properly assume their 
responsibilities.4  For a long time, many West Germany sports officials and politicians were probably 
even convinced—or at least justified ex post their actions with the idea—of operating for a higher 
national interest. A series of parliamentary hearings and the detailed historical reconstruction of 
Singler and Treutlein (2010: 202-239) document the attempts of the National Olympic Committee 
(NOK), the German Sport Federation (DSB), leading sports physicians, such as Keul, and several 
politicians in the mid-1970s to question and even weaken the IOC’s prohibition of steroids, minimize 
or deny the harms associated with their use and, in some cases, even to legalize their administration 
to elite athletes by physicians. The overall aim of these maneuvers was to secure the “equality of 
chances” of West German athletes versus their East German counterparts, who were very effectively 
being doped by East German officials (Spitzer, 2013).     
The results of these studies thus anticipate what has recently emerged from the scandals 
surrounding the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF; e.g., Independent 
Commission, 2015) and the Russian state doping program (e.g., McLaren, 2016a and b). Older 
scandals, moreover, prove that sports authorities and federation officials in other western countries 
also long regarded doping as a de facto legitimate practice or, even if they increasingly had “doubts” 
about its formal legitimacy, they still supported or tolerated it in the pursuit of the higher goal of 
sports success. A good case in point here is the 2001 Lahti scandal.  A few days before the start of the 
2001 Nordic World Championships in Lahti, Finland, the team physician of the Finnish national ski 
team mistakenly left his bag containing plasma expander, bloody needles and intravenous tubes at a 
petrol station. A scandal burst when six Finnish skiers tested positive for plasma expander a few days 
afterwards and the bag was linked to the team physicians and positive tests. Most probably, the 
athletes had taken EPO, then used plasma expanders to lower their hematocrit levels before the 
races. A Doping Enquiry Taskforce (2001: 3) set up by the Finnish Ministry of Education to investigate 
the scandal concluded: “What made the Lahti doping cases serious was not only the large number of 
perpetrators, six, but also that doping had taken place under the auspices of Finnish Ski Federation 
                                                          
4 The Commission’s analyses further show that the internal and external weaknesses in the Freiburg 
University Sport Medicine’s governance also allowed numerous instances of scientific misconduct and breaches 
of scientific integrity, such as plagiarism, data manipulation and falsification in scientific activities and 
publications (e.g., Köppelle, 2014). 
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coaching.” In 2008, Kari-Pekka Kyrö, the former coach of the Finnish national team and the only 
person sentenced for the 2001 scandal, finally admitted that “in the 1990s there was a 
pharmacological program in the Finnish Ski Federation” and that Finnish skiers systematically took 
EPO, GH and plasma expander (Hahn and Häyrinen, 2008). 
The scandal affecting the Austrian Ski Federation that burst at the 2006 Turin Olympic Games also 
suggests that doping has continued to be tolerated at the highest levels in western countries even in 
the current century. This federation hired and protected the trainer Walter Mayer, even after he had 
been suspended by the IOC, allowed the doping of many of its biathlon and cross-country athletes 
under Mayer’s supervision and even set up two hematological “laboratories” to check the athletes’ 
blood values at their training location in Austria and at their premises at the Olympic Village in Turin. 
After these events became public thanks to the intervention of Italy’s law enforcement agencies, the 
IOC Disciplinary Commission concluded that the whole Austrian Olympic Committee had  
breached its obligations under the Olympic Charter, the IOC Code of Ethics and 
applicable anti-doping regulations … 1. through its responsibility for the conduct of the 
Austrian Ski Federation, as well as for the anti-doping rule violations committed by its 
athletes and support staff at the Torino Olympic Games …; 2. by failing to prevent Mr. 
Mayer from participating in the Torino Olympic Games in breach of the IOC’s decision 
against Mr. Mayer after the “Blood Bag Affair”… ; and 3. by failing to implement 
appropriate organisational changes in an attempt to prevent a repeat of the problems 
experienced in 2002 (IOC, 2007). 
The IOC itself did not make a credible effort to implement their own sports rules and anti-doping 
tests at least until the new century—its mild treatment of Russian athletes at the 2016 Rio Olympics 
suggests a persistent lack of enthusiasm among senior members of the IOC for an intensive anti-
doping program. Even Dick Pound (2011), former IOC vice-president and founding president of 
WADA, is very critical:  
The response to doping in sport, on the part of sports authorities and governments, did 
not come until long after the phenomenon was recognized as a serious problem in 
virtually every sport. Years and years and years of endemic doping in cycling passed 
almost without notice and, when it was noticed, it was denied or passed off as an 
isolated aberration. The growing use of anabolic steroids, stimulants and other doping 
methods in other sports were met with institutional denial, individual lies and 
inconsequential sanctions. Testing was introduced with enormous reluctance and 
testing programs were normally limited to in-competition tests, in which a positive test 
was, in effect, failure of an intelligence test as much as a doping test.  
It is plausible that the IOC’s longstanding neglect of doping has been driven by its growing concern 
with commercial issues, since effective controls would expose numerous famous athletes and 
alienate Olympic corporate sponsors (e.g., Hoberman 2001: 245). This critical view of the IOC is 
reinforced by persistent allegations of suppressed positive test results at several Olympic Games 
during the 1980s and, more recently, at the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing and the 2014 Winter 
Olympic games in Sochi (Hanstad, Smith and Waddington, 2008: 230; McLaren, 2016a and b; 
Independent Commission, 2015; Rumsby, 2017). 
  
A quasi-illegal market 
In the case of the use and supply of doping products, the “walls of secrecy and silence” are further 
enhanced by the inherently ambiguous legal status of such products. Most of these, in fact, are also 
legitimate, well-established pharmaceutical products and therefore cannot be entirely prohibited, as 
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was done with heroin or cocaine. Because of this ambiguity, a drug may begin its “life” as a legal 
product at one end of the supply chain and conclude its “life” as an illegal product at the other. Given 
the lack of harmonization of the relevant criminal law legislation within the EU let alone across more 
disparate borders, the same supply activities can or are likely to have different legal statuses in different 
countries. Moreover, in the case of doping, one of the parties to a transaction involving doping products 
may be ignorant of any illegality or rule-breaking, reflecting the embeddedness of doping exchanges in 
legitimate social networks and professional activities. This is, for example, the case of a pharmacist who 
sells a doping product on the basis of a fraudulent or stolen prescription. 
For all these reasons, my coauthors and I (e.g., Paoli and Donati, 2014 and Paoli and Greenfield, 
2017) have conceptualized the market for doping products as a quasi-illegal market, that is a market 
in which the legal status of many supply-side doping-related activities varies along the distribution 
chain and by location. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The findings of the three research projects here summarized and the numerous scandals surrounding 
doping suggest an ongoing process of de-legitimization and criminalization that is investing the use of 
doping products in elite sports and the related supply. As other forms of corporate crime, doping, 
too, can be considered an “index of social change” (Nelken, 2007: 758), that is an activity on which 
social perceptions and legislation are changing but are often not fully synchronized with each other. 
Discussing the Enron scandal, Nelken makes a few considerations that are also fully applicable to 
doping in elite sports: “some relevant misbehavior was legally criminal but not widely stigmatized 
socially, other misconduct was socially disapproved of, but not technically criminal and the line 
between these was a changing one” (ibid.: 763). In the case of doping in elite sports, the mismatch is 
further exacerbated by the fact that sports rules are often distinct from government legislation and 
differ from the latter in their legitimacy and enforcement. 
On a more positive note, the analysis suggests that law enforcement can help effectively tear down 
the “walls of secrecy and silence” surrounding illegal or otherwise prohibited practices. The athletes 
and their suppliers and protectors within the elite sports worlds are white-collar criminals par 
excellence and, as other corporate criminals, are therefore sensible to deterrent measures, as they 
have a lot to lose. And even if the behavior does not change, criminal investigations can at least 
disclose illegal or otherwise prohibited practices. As criminologists, we are mostly skeptical of the 
application of criminal law, as we are all too well aware of the many serious harmful, intended and 
unintended, consequences that often accompany it. Whereas these criticisms are well founded, the 
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